Case Study of the U.S. Army

Report Number: NPS-CE-13-123

Series: Cost Estimating

Category: Project Management

Report Series: Case Study

Authors: Yeong "Sam" M. Choi, Jason A. Morneault, Daniel J. Poole

Title: Case Study of the U.S. Army

Published: 2013-12-01

Sponsored By: Acquisition Research Program

Status: Published--Unlimited Distribution

Research Type: Graduate Student

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Keywords: Project Management, Weapon Systems, Military Procurement, Cost Overruns, Military Acquisition, Efficiency


On May 22, 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA). The intent of this law is to reform acquisition processes, control unsustainable cost growth, and make programs more affordable. In 2010, despite WSARA, program cost, schedule overruns, and less-than-desirable performance were still prevalent in DoD acquisition.
In response, Ashton Carter, under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics (USD[AT&L]), issued his Better Buying Power (BBP) memorandum directing the implementation of Should-Cost Management (SCM). In April 2011, Carter issued an additional directive that should-cost estimates would be required for all acquisition category (ACAT) programs and that SCM initiative progress would be briefed at every milestone review. In November 2012, Frank Kendall, Carter